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Abstract
The voting rules of the European Council (EU) under the Treaty
of Lisbon became effective on 1 November 2014. Kurz & Napel (2015)
showed that the dimension of this voting system is between 7 and
13, 368. The lower bound 7 actually sets a new world record for the
dimension of the real-world voting bodies. In this article, by finding
a new way to represent the union of two weighted games as an inter-
section of certain weighted games (Theorem 1), we greatly reduce the
upper bound 13, 368 to just 25. We also consider what will happen
to our upper bound and Kurz & Napel’s lower bound if the United
Kingdom is no longer a member of the European Union Council.
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1 Introduction
The voting rules used in the European Council (EU) under the Treaty of
Lisbon (which became effective on 1 November 2014) is quite unique within
the current, global range of electoral systems. It not only requires a “qualified
majority” of both the number of member states supporting a proposal and
the population of the supporting member states, but also specifies a “blocking
minority” which can block a proposal if certain condition is satisfied. It is the
existence of such a “blocking minority” that makes the system complicated
and interesting to study from the mathematical point of view. In fact, Kurz
& Napel (2015) showed that this voting system has dimension between 7
and 13368 and therefore this dimension sets a world record of the dimension
of the real-world voting bodies. Indeed, the previous record holders are EU
under Treaty of Nice and the Legislative Council of Hong Kong and both
of them have dimension 3 (see Freixas (2004) and Cheung & Ng (2014)).
In this article, we will reduce Kurz & Napel’s upper bound to 25 or even
24 (depending on the populations of the countries in EU). This is achieved
by finding a new way to represent the union of two weighted games as an
intersection of certain weighted games (Theorem 1). It is expected that
Theorem 1 will be useful for computing the dimension of other real world
voting systems. Finally, assuming that the United Kingdom is no longer a
member of the European Union Council, we will show that our upper bound
will jump to 1362 while Kurz & Napel’s lower bound will only increase to 8.
2
2 Notations and definitions
Definition 2.1. A simple game is a pair (N, v) where N is the set of players
described as {1, . . . , n} and v is the characteristic function which satisfies:
1. v(S) = 0 or 1, for all S ⊆ N ;
2. v(S) ≤ v(T ) if S ⊆ T ;
3. v(∅) = 0 and v(N) = 1.
A coalition S is winning if v(S) = 1 and losing if v(S) = 0 and we let W(v)
be the set of winning coalitions of v.
Definition 2.2. A weighted majority game is a simple game which can be
realized by a vector (w1, ..., wn) together with a threshold q which makes the
representation [q;w1, . . . , wn] so that S is a winning coalition if and only if
∑
j∈S wj ≥ q.
Definition 2.3. Let v1, v2 be two simple games with identical player set N .
The intersection of v1 and v2, denoted by v1 ∧ v2 is the simple game with
W(v1 ∧ v2) =W(v1) ∩W(v2) and the union of v1 and v2, denoted by v1 ∨ v2
is the simple game with W(v1 ∨ v2) =W(v1) ∪W(v2).
Definition 2.4. The dimension of v is the smallest k such that v coincides
with the intersection v1 ∧ v2 · · · ∧ vk of k weighted games.
The codimension of v is the smallest k such that v coincides with the
union v1 ∨ v2 · · · ∨ vk of k weighted games.
The boolean dimension of v is the smallest k such that v can be represented
as unions and intersections of k weighted games.
3
3 Data sets and the voting rule
Let us first state the rule of the voting game vEU of the EU systems: We
numbered the 28 EU members by 1, . . . , 28 (see Table 1 or 2). A motion will
be passed if
(1) at least 55% of EU members support the motion (and we let the
weighted majority game v16 := [16; 1, 1, . . . , 1])
and either
(2a) the EU members that support the motion represent at least 65% of the
total population (and we let v65 := [0.65
∑
wj;w1, w2, . . . , w28] where
wj is the population of the j-th country), or
(2b) no more than four EU members reject the motion (and we let v25 :=
[25; 1, . . . , 1]).
Therefore vEU = v16 ∧ (v65 ∨ v25) and hence the boolean dimension of vEU is
3 (see [3]). Note that we also have vEU = (v16 ∧ v65) ∨ v25.
To compute the dimension of vEU , we need to know the populations
of the 28 EU members. Here we will use four data sets. The 2014 data
(Table 1) is from Kurz & Napel (2015) [3], it will provide a clear compar-
ison between their estimation and ours. The 2016, 2017, 2018 data (Table
2,3,4) are taken from http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat on 7 March, 2019. In-
deed, according to Kurl & Napel (2015), their data set was also taken from
http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat, but it seems the website had adjusted the data
afterward. Note that the orders of the countries are not the same in the four
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Table 1: 2014 EU population
# Country Population
1 Germany 80,780,000
2 France 65,856,609
3 United Kingdom 64,308,261
4 Italy 60,782,668
5 Spain 46,507,760
6 Poland 38,495,659
7 Romania 19,942,642
8 Netherlands 16,829,289
9 Belgium 11,203,992
10 Greece 10,992,589
11 Czech Republic 10,512,419
12 Portugal 10,427,301
13 Hungary 9,879,000
14 Sweden 9,644,864
15 Austria 8,507,786
16 Bulgaria 7,245,677
17 Denmark 5,627,235
18 Finland 5,451,270
19 Slovakia 5,415,949
20 Ireland 4,604,029
21 Croatia 4,246,700
22 Lithuania 2,943,472
23 Slovenia 2,061,085
24 Latvia 2,001,468
25 Estonia 1,315,819
26 Cyprus 858,000
27 Luxembourg 549,680
28 Malta 425,384
Total population 507,416,607
Table 2: 2016 EU population
# Country Population
1 Germany 82,175,684
2 France 66,730,453
3 United Kingdom 65,382,556
4 Italy 60,665,551
5 Spain 46,440,099
6 Poland 37,967,209
7 Romania 19,760,314
8 Netherlands 16,979,120
9 Belgium 11,311,117
10 Greece 10,783,748
11 Czech Republic 10,553,843
12 Portugal 10,341,330
13 Sweden 9,851,017
14 Hungary 9,830,485
15 Austria 8,700,471
16 Bulgaria 7,153,784
17 Denmark 5,707,251
18 Finland 5,487,308
19 Slovakia 5,426,252
20 Ireland 4,726,286
21 Croatia 4,190,669
22 Lithuania 2,888,558
23 Slovenia 2,064,188
24 Latvia 1,968,957
25 Estonia 1,315,944
26 Cyprus 848,319
27 Luxembourg 576,249
28 Malta 450,415
Total population 510,277,177
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Table 3: 2017 EU population
# Country Population
1 Germany 82,521,653
2 France 66,989,083
3 United Kingdom 65,808,573
4 Italy 60,589,445
5 Spain 46,527,039
6 Poland 37,972,964
7 Romania 19,644,350
8 Netherlands 17,081,507
9 Belgium 11,351,727
10 Greece 10,768,193
11 Czech Republic 10,578,820
12 Portugal 10,309,573
13 Sweden 9,995,153
14 Hungary 9,797,561
15 Austria 8,772,865
16 Bulgaria 7,101,859
17 Denmark 5,748,769
18 Finland 5,503,297
19 Slovakia 5,435,343
20 Ireland 4,784,383
21 Croatia 4,154,213
22 Lithuania 2,847,904
23 Slovenia 2,065,895
24 Latvia 1,950,116
25 Estonia 1,315,635
26 Cyprus 854,802
27 Luxembourg 590,667
28 Malta 460,297
Total population 511,521,686
Table 4: 2018 EU population
# Country Population
1 Germany 82,850,000
2 France 67,221,943
3 United Kingdom 66,238,007
4 Italy 60,483,973
5 Spain 46,659,302
6 Poland 37,976,687
7 Romania 19,523,621
8 Netherlands 17,181,084
9 Belgium 11,413,058
10 Greece 10,738,868
11 Czech Republic 10,610,055
12 Portugal 10,291,027
13 Sweden 10,120,242
14 Hungary 9,778,371
15 Austria 8,822,267
16 Bulgaria 7,050,034
17 Denmark 5,781,190
18 Finland 5,513,130
19 Slovakia 5,443,120
20 Ireland 4,838,259
21 Croatia 4,105,493
22 Lithuania 2,808,901
23 Slovenia 2,066,880
24 Latvia 1,934,379
25 Estonia 1,319,133
26 Cyprus 864,236
27 Luxembourg 602,005
28 Malta 475,701
Total population 512,710,966
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tables, as we arranged the countries in descending populations, which will
make it easier to study the voting game mathematically.
4 Realization of games as intersection of weighted
games
In this section, we explain two constructions which are useful to realize a
game as intersections of weighted games.
I) Suppose that we have two simple games v and v′ with identical player
set N such thatW(v) ⊂ W(v′). Let F be the set of maximal coalitions
which is winning in v′ but losing in v. For each S ∈ F , define vS to be
a weighted game with quota 1 and the weight wSj = 1 if j /∈ S and 0 if
j ∈ S. Note that a coalition W is losing in vS if and only if W ⊆ S.
Therefore, we have
W(v) =W(v′) ∩
⋂
S∈F
W(vS)
and hence
v = v′ ∧ (
∧
S∈F
vS).
Note that if we set v′ = [1; 1, . . . , 1] then the construction is essen-
tially the proof that every simple game v is the intersection of weighted
games.
II) Let vA = [q
A;wA1 , w
A
2 , . . . , w
A
n ] and vB = [q
B;wB1 , w
B
2 , . . . , w
B
n ] be two
weighted games. We want to realize vA ∨ vB as an intersection of k
weighted voting systems.
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Let wI(S) =
∑
j∈S w
I
j for I = A or B and D = {S ⊂ {1, . . . , n} :
wA(S) < qA but wB(S) ≥ qB}.
If D = ∅ then vA ∨ vB = vA and we are done. Now suppose D 6= ∅ and
let u = qA −minS∈D w
A(S) and T = ∩S∈DS.
Suppose that T 6= ∅. Then for each k ∈ T , we define
vk = [qA;wA1 , . . . , w
A
k−1, w
A
k + u, w
A
k+1, . . . , w
A
n ].
Note that if S is winning in vA, then it is winning in v
k for each k ∈ T .
Now suppose S is winning in vB but not winning in vA. In this case,
S ∈ D by the definition of D and hence for each k ∈ T , we have k ∈ S
and wk(S) = wA(S) + u ≥ qA. Hence S is a winning coalition of vk.
Therefore W(vA ∨ vB) ⊆ W(
∧
k∈T v
k). If we let v = vA ∨ vB and
v′ =
∧
k∈T v
k and apply the construction I, we have
vA ∨ vB = (
∧
k∈T
vk) ∧ (
∧
S∈F
vS).
Note that this method may not yield good results when T is not big,
as we will see in the next section.
We conclude this section by stating the result we just obtained.
Theorem 1. Let vA and vB be two weighted games with the same set of
players. Then
vA ∨ vB = (
∧
k∈T
vk) ∧ (
∧
S∈F
vS).
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5 Upper bound of the dimension of the EU
system.
Recall that vEU = v16 ∧ (v65 ∨ v25). Hence the dimension of vEU is 1 plus the
dimension of v65∨v25. In this section, we will obtain a two digit upper bound
on the dimension of v65 ∨ v25 based on the populations of the EU members
in 2014,2016-18 given in Table 1-4 respectively.
5.1 2014 data
Let vA = v65 and vB = v25. For any S ⊂ N , define S
c = N\S. Using the
populations given in Table 1, one can check that D = {{1, 2, 3}c, {1, 2, 4}c,
{1, 2, 5}c, {1, 2, 6}c, {1, 3, 4}c, {1, 3, 5}c, {1, 3, 6}c, {1, 4, 5}c, {1, 4, 6}c, {2, 3, 4}c}.
Hence u = qA − (w4 + · · · + w28) = 33349058, T = {7, 8, . . . , 28} and
F = {{1, 2, 7, 8, . . . , 28}}.
Apply Theorem 1 to v65∨v25 so that vEU = v16∧(v65∨v25) can be realized
as the intersection of the following 24 weighted games:


16; 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, . . . , 1
qA; w1, . . . , w6, w7 + u, w8, . . . , w28
qA; w1, . . . , w6, w7, w8 + u, . . . , w28
...
...
...
...
...
...
qA; w1, . . . , w6, w7, w8, . . . , w28 + u
1; 0, 0, 1, 1, 1, 1, 0, 0, . . . , 0


Therefore, the dimension of vEU in 2014 is at most 24.
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5.2 A remark
If we take vA = v25 and vB = v65 using 2014 data, thenD contains {1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6},
{3, 4, . . . , 26}, {1, 2, 6, 7, . . . , 26}, {1, 2, 3, 7, . . . , 27} and hence T = ∅ and our
method produces no good upper bound.
5.3 2016 data
We take vA = v65 and vB = v25 for the 2016 data set. Just like the 2014 data
set, we haveD = {{1, 2, 3}c, {1, 2, 4}c, {1, 2, 5}c,{1, 2, 6}c, {1, 3, 4}c, {1, 3, 5}c, {1, 3, 6}c,
{1, 4, 5}c, {1, 4, 6}c, {2, 3, 4}c} and T = {7, 8, . . . , 28}. However, u = 35656002
and F = {{1, 2, 7, 8, . . . , 28}, {1, 3, 7, 8, . . . , 28}}. Hence vEU can be realized
as the intersection of the following 25 weighted games:


16; 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, . . . , 1
qA; w1, . . . , w6, w7 + u, w8, . . . , w28
qA; w1, . . . , w6, w7, w8 + u, . . . , w28
...
...
...
...
...
...
qA; w1, . . . , w6, w7, w8, . . . , w28 + u
1; 0, 1, 0, 1, 1, 1, 0, 0, . . . , 0
1; 0, 0, 1, 1, 1, 1, 0, 0, . . . , 0


Therefore, the dimension of vEU in 2016 is at most 25.
5.4 2017 data
For this case, D = {{1, 2, 3}c, {1, 2, 4}c, {1, 2, 5}c, {1, 2, 6}c, {1, 3, 4}c, {1, 3, 5}c,
{1, 3, 6}c, {1, 4, 5}c, {1, 4, 6}c, {2, 3, 4}c, {2, 3, 5}c} and u = 35656002 but we
still have T = {7, 8, . . . , 28} and F = {{1, 2, 7, 8, . . . , 28}, {1, 3, 7, 8, . . . , 28}}.
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As a result, vEU can be again realized as the intersection of 25 weighted
games as in the case for the 2016 data set.
5.5 2018 data
In this case, everything is identical to that of the 2017 data set, except
u = 36226115. Therefore, the dimension of vEU in 2018 is again at most 25.
5.6 2018 data without UK
The United Kingdom has been seriously considering the possibility of leav-
ing the EU during the preparation of this paper. Therefore, it would be
interesting to see what happens to our upper bound if UK is no longer a
member of the EU. Using the 2018 data set without UK, we found that
T = {16, 17, . . . , 28} and |F| = 1348. Hence, the upper bound of the dimen-
sion of vEU then jumps to 1362.
Also, we would like to point out that Kurz & Napel lower bound of vEU
will also change with the absence of UK. Using the similar method introduced
in section 5 of the paper by Kurz & Napel (2015), we find the following set
of losing coalitions with the ’pairwise incompatibility property’ (see Kurz &
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Napel (2015), section 4):
{{1, 2, 7, 8, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28},
{2, 4, 5, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28},
{2, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28},
{4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 27, 28},
{1, 5, 6, 7, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 25, 26, 27, 28},
{1, 4, 6, 8, 9, 11, 12, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28},
{2, 4, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 16, 17, 18, 19, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28}}
where the numbers correspond to each country’s population ranking in 2018
data. Note that the number 3 (which represents the UK) is absent. This can
be extended by adding the maximal losing coalition {1, 2, 4, 5, . . . , 15} of the
14 largest countries. Therefore, the lower bound of vEU will increase to 8 if
UK leaves EU.
6 Conclusion
Kurz & Napel (2015) used integer linear programing to estimate the upper
bound of the voting system of EU and gets a large bound 13368. Our esti-
mation made use of the structure of the voting system to get a much smaller
upper bound 25. Moreover, our estimation indicates that the dimension is
sensitive to the populations of the countries.
In general, our method works best if T is close to {1, . . . , n}. From the
fact that v1∧ (v2∨v3) = (v1∧v2)∨ (v1∧v3), one may notice that our method
can actually be extended to all simple games.
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